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The First Fault Model • In the first model we suppose that at least one of the bytes e 1 to e 4 is zero. 
The Second Fault Model • The second model is the complement of the first one i.e., in the second model, all four bytes of one column should be faulty.
• All four bytes of one column are influenced by the occurred fault. 
Fault Models
• All possible faults can be covered by one of the two presented models and there is no fault that is not included in one of these two models.
• The intersection of the two presented models is empty and the union of them is all possible faults which can occur in four bytes (256 4 − 1).
• Any occurred fault in other units of the encryption algorithm from the beginning of the algorithm up to MixColumns of round 9 can be considered as another fault occurred in MixColumns input of the 9 th round, then it's coverable with one of the illustrated models. None of previous fault models against AES had this capability.
Attack Methods
• At the first, we generate two set S 1 and S 2 . These two sets can be generated using function MixColumns independent of plaintext and key. 
• After MixColumns of round 9 each byte of its output affects on one byte of Ciphertext independent of other bytes, because the MixColumns of round 10 is omitted. In fact it causes the success of these attacks. As a result, we could consider each column of MixColumns output in round 9 independently. • A : output of MixColumns in round 9, AddRK : AddRoundKey • We know that ε′′ is the difference at the output of SubBytes.
So, we generate set EI. • But all values of ε′ are not useful then we generate set I.
• In other words, set I contains all possible values for the first column of SubBytes input at the last round. Thus, we gather some faulty Ciphertexts caused by same plaintext and different faults that are covered by the first model. Then we will decrease the size of set I by repeating the proposed method using collected faulty Ciphertexts until set I has only one element. Now we know four bytes of SubBytes input at the last round and we know the fault free Ciphertext; thus, we can exploit the 10 th roundkey.
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• One of the advantages of this attack is that finding every four bytes of 10 th Roundkey can be processed separately and parallel. Also, we can employ four dedicated systems that each one tries to find four bytes of K10.
• The other method to attack is completely similar to the presented one but we assume occurred faults can be covered by the second fault model and we use S 2 for limiting (e′ 1 , e′ 2 , e′ 3 , e′ 4 ) in EI. All other specifications and advantages of the first method are true for the second method.
Experimental Results
• At the first, we implemented the first method of attack. We started with the first column of MixColumn input in round 9 and we selected faulty Ciphertexts that all four bytes in 1, 14, 11 and 8 locations are different with fault free Ciphertext. In this situation, we ran the attack algorithm to 1000 encryption unit with different random generated keys. In average 6 faulty Ciphertexts were needed to find all four bytes of 10th RoundKey and the needed time is not considerable (10 seconds). Experimental Results (cont'd)
• S 2 has more elements and calculating of intersection between S 2 and EI needs more time comparing to the first method. On the other hand, S 2 needs 15.5 GB memory. After improving, optimizing and using memory management techniques on the implementation of the attack, we succeeded to do it with 762.5 MB memory and in almost 2 hours. We should specify that the simulations have been done using Visual C++ on a 2GHz centrino with 1GB memory. We applied this attack to AES with 100 random keys. Each attack needed 1495 faulty Ciphertexts and 2 hours in average to find four bytes of K10. Using Fault Attack Assumption to Break AES
• In proposed methods we supposed faults occur only on internal values, but we assumed RoundKeys and KeyExpansion unit is completely fault free. As previously described, any fault that happen before the MixColumns of round 9 is coverable with one of our proposed fault models.
• We can suppose fault occurred on the beginning of the encryption algorithm means plaintext. Thus, changing in plaintext that leads to different Ciphertexts can be assumed as a fault that occurred in the plaintext and is covered by one of our two models.
• Then that's enough to know that the caused difference in MixColumns input of round 9 is coverable with which of our fault models.
Future Works
• We are working on designing a method to generate some Ciphertexts that we know which model covers the difference between each of them. Also, we are trying to construct a test method to know the difference between two Ciphertexts at MixColumns input in round 9 is coverable with which fault models. Then, by finding any method or designing a rule, we will break AES with 128-bit key and its period will be finished.
• Additionally, we don't need to know plaintexts and if we can find a method to distinguish and classify the different Ciphertexts based on MixColumns input of round 9, we will have a successful Ciphertext Only Attack and it's not necessary to run a Known Plaintext Attack.
